

STATE OF MAINE  
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

Docket No. 2002-151

September 24, 2003

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION  
Investigation into the Adequacy of Utility Services  
in Maine During Power Outages

Responses to CMP's  
Record Reference  
Requests

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The following responses are provided to the Record Reference Requests made by CMP on September 18, 2003. As a preliminary matter, many of the questions posed by CMP were not record reference requests but instead were requests to further explain judgments and conclusions reached in the Examiner's Report. As such, there is no record to reference. Nonetheless, we note the factual discussion in the Report that lead to the conclusions. If CMP disagrees with the Hearing Examiner's conclusions, it may make its argument in its Exceptions.

**1. Please provide the record references for the statement on page 3 "the lack of centralized management . . . resulted in . . . inefficient deployment of resources."**

The referenced language is from the Executive Summary section of the Report and reflects the conclusions reached by the Advisory Staff after consideration of the information discussed on pages 83-99.

**2. Please provide copies of all materials provided to the Commission as referenced in footnote 18 on page 15 of the Examiner's Report.**

The information cited in footnote 18 is available from the National Weather Service.

**3. Please provide the record references for the statement "Inquiries and complaints from elected officials and emergency management directors related to utility response to the Storm, and related communications problems that arose between utility and emergency management personnel." that were received by the Commission during and after the storm. See page 17 of the Examiner's Report.**

The Notice of Investigation in this matter specifically stated that the Commission had received a number of complaints from "representatives of other State agencies and County governments" who recommended that the Commission initiate an investigation. On December 18, 2002, we held a Technical Conference with emergency management personnel and the utilities (including

CMP). CMP was provided an opportunity at that time to ask any questions it had regarding emergency management officials' complaints to the Commission.

**4. Please provide the record references for the statement "Despite utility restoration efforts, many customers' services (60,000 reported to CMP and 10,000 reported to BHE) were interrupted for a number of days." See Page 54 of Examiner's Report.**

The 60,000 figure for CMP and the 10,000 figure for BHE refer to the total number of outages reported. CMP's total outage figure is based on information contained in CMP's press releases and e-mails sent to the Commission from CMP. This total outage figure may be low, as it is significantly less than the outage figures provided in CMP's response to ADV-01-31 and Attachment B "Crew Deployment" of Douglas A. Herling's, CMP's Vice President Of Customer Services, letter, dated March 11, 2002, to Steven Dunn.

CMP's Crew Deployment Report shows 72,200 CMP accounts without power on January 13, 2002, 38,150 accounts on January 14, 2002, 7,645 accounts on January 15, 2002, and 3,726 accounts without power on January 16, 2002.

**5. Please provide the record references for the statement "CMP's Storm Plan contained incorrect contact numbers." See page 55 of the Examiner's Report.**

Tr. 11/7/02 at 113-115, Tr. 12/18/2002 at 20-21 and also Mr. Herling's March 11, 2002 letter to Steve Dunn, page 2, which states "The plans we used at the time of the storm were signed in December of 1999. These plans did have some incorrect information for CMP and for the EMA agencies. On February 4, 2002, we met with the Directors of Waldo and Knox Counties; and we revised our notification plan with new phone numbers, pager numbers and other information that was out-of-date."

**6. Please provide the record references for the statement "CMP did not have adequate written procedures in place to address monitoring of weather reports and escalation procedures, especially on weekends." See page 55 of the Examiner's Report.**

The quoted statement is a summary of the conclusions reached by the Advisors based upon the information discussed on pp. 56-59.

**7. Please provide the record references for the statement "Unfortunately, these escalating reports did not prompt any further action by CMP." See page 56 of the Examiner's Report.**

See ODR -01-02, and Tr. 11/7/02 at 18-21.

**8. Please provide the record references for the statement “CMP took a “wait and see” approach, similar to any normal weekend without severe weather.” See page 60 of the Examiner’s Report.**

The quoted statement is the Advisory Staff’s characterization of the information cited in the response to Question No. 7.

**9. Please provide the record references for the statement “However, these plans limit notification to power outages [only for] a Level 3 storm.” See page 63 and 64 of the Examiner’s Report.**

ODR-02-02 contains copies of the Communication/Coordination Plans CMP has developed with the County EMAs. The second paragraph in those plans states “When a power outage is sufficient enough for activation of CMP’s Storm Operations Center, CMP will notify the ... County Communications Center...” Since the reference in the plan refers to the CMP Storm Operations Center, the Staff understands this to refer to CMP’s Corporate Storm Operations Center, which is only activated for Level 3 storms. At Tr. 12/18/2002 at 11, Mr. Herling states in response to the question of whether CMP’s emergency center is activated during a level three storm, “Yes, our storm room is only activated during a Level three storm, the corporate one. We have local storm rooms that are activated in the local office, but the corporate room is just Level three.”

**10. Please provide the record references for the statement “CMP corrected the trunking problem sometime on Sunday afternoon, January 12th, but the problem was not completely resolved until CMP activated 21st Century . . . at approximately 6:30 p.m. on Sunday.” See page 65 of the Examiner’s Report.**

ADV 01-28 discusses the two technical problems that CMP had with its internal IVR system, which reduced the number of lines available for customers to call in on resulting in busy signals and the delay in activating 21st Century. CMP’s response stated, “Fixing the technical problem did help reduce the busy signals; however, CMP’s outage lines continued to give intermittent busy signals from 4 to 6 PM. At 6 PM, when CMP noticed the busy signals increase significantly, the Company decided to switch to 21st Century.” See also Tr. 11/7/2002 at 54, where Ms. Grenier states, “Prior to 6:30 we did not have 21st Century, but after 6:30 we had every call”; Mr. Herling’s letter of March 11, 2002, Pages 3 and 4, where Mr. Herling stated that “On this Sunday afternoon, we encountered a couple of technical issues that once resolved should have cleared the telephone lines of busy signals. We discovered and resolved the first problem, only to find another technical issue that caused us to deliver a busy signal longer than we would have liked. These problems extended the time delay in making the decision to switch over to 21st Century.”

**11. Please provide the record references for the statement “CMP uses customer outage calls to populate its Smart Map outage-tracking system, which CMP operational personnel rely upon in planning restoration activities.” See page 66 of the Examiner’s Report.**

See Tr. 11/7/2002 at 51-52 where Mr. Herling stated, “We have the smart map that you can go in - it’s more automated. You can go in - our circuit map - and click on places and gather customer outage information.” When asked by Mr. Howe, “What populates those systems?” Mr. Herling responded, “Customer calls.”

**12. Please provide the record references for the statement “The fact that many outages were not initially reported due to the inability of CMP’s customers to contact CMP may have contributed to CMP underestimating the severity of the storm.” See page 66 of the Examiner’s Report.**

The quoted statement is a conclusion reached by the Advisory Staff based upon the information discussed at pp. 64-67. See also Response to Question No. 10.

**13. Please provide the record references for the statement “The problem with CMP’s phone system impacted CMP’s storm assessment.” See page 66 of the Examiner’s Report.**

The quoted statement is a conclusion reached by the Advisory Staff based upon the information discussed at pp. 64-67. See also Response to Question No. 10.

**14. Please provide the record references for the statement “For CMP, the incorrect classification meant that communication was handled by the regional service centers throughout the storm where there were not sufficient resources to keep all customers accurately informed about restoration activities.” See page 70 of the Examiner’s Report.**

See CMP’s Emergency Service Restoration Plan at 8. A Level 3 storm is defined as, “Opening of “War” room for the dispatching of line crews when Company-wide customer outages affects greater than 10% of our total customer base.” CMP had in excess of 60,000 customer accounts out of service, which was greater than 10% of CMP’s total customer base, making it a Level 3 Storm according to CMP’s definition of a Level 3 storm. See also CMP’s January 2002 Storm Critique **BEGIN PROPRIETARY** -----  
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**15. Please provide the record references for the statement “Commission heard from a number of CMP and BHE customers during the Storm who expressed their need for more detailed information regarding the service restoration efforts. These customers reported that the information they were receiving from CMP and BHE was very general and often the same information that they had received a day or two earlier.” See page 70 of the Examiner’s report.**

There is no record reference for this statement; it is based on Advisor Steven Dunn’s experience and the experience of the other CAD Complaint Specialists, who responded to customer calls during the January 2002 storm. Calls from customers during storm outages are normally logged as informational requests and a detailed record is not made of the call. The CAD Specialists provide the customers with what information they have concerning the outage and if the customer is reporting a problem reaching the utility, the need for more detailed service restoration information, or the need for immediate assistance from the utility, the Specialist contacts the utility and provides the utility representative with the customer’s phone number and a description of the customer’s issue, so that the utility representative can contact the customer directly and address the issue with the customer. If the calls had not been treated as informal information requests, they would have been considered complaints against CMP and specific numbers would have been available. .

**16. Please provide the record references for the statement “We believe that CMP’s failure to upgrade the storm to the proper classification resulted in a failure to allocate adequate resources for communicating restoration information to its customers.” See page 71 of the Examiner’s Report.**

The quoted statement is a conclusion reached by the Advisors based on the information discussed at pp. 70-73. See also Response to Question No. 14.

**17. Please provide the record references for the statement “CMP and BHE provided only limited assistance and service restoration information to other utilities seeking to restore their services due to lack of utility provided power during Winter Storm 2002.” See page 77 of the Examiner’s Report.**

The quoted statement is a conclusion reached by the Advisors based on the information discussed at pp. 77-80.

**18. Please provide the record references for the statement “We are not satisfied with CMP’s continued insistence on local-only communication during Level 1 and 2 storm, especially in view of the miscategorization of this Storm.” See page 80 of the Examiner’s Report.**

The quoted statement is a conclusion reached by the Advisors based on the information discussed at pp. 77-80.

**19. Please provide the record references for the statement “The CAD was forced to contact CMP daily to obtain more specific restoration information, including the number of customers out of service in each area, the number of line and tree crews in each area, the estimated restoration times, the number of poles in each area, etc.” See page 82 of the Examiner’s Report.**

There is no record reference for this statement as the statement is based on Advisor Steven Dunn’s experience. Mr. Dunn contacted either Ms. Rhonda Pellerin or Mr. Kevin Elwell at CMP each day of the service restoration process, starting on Monday, January 14, 2002, in order to obtain this information.

**20. Please provide the record references for the statement “CMP failed to accurately track and monitor crew deployment.” See page 83 of the Examiner’s Report.**

The quoted statement is a conclusion reached by the Advisors based on the information discussed at pp. 84-89.

**21. Please provide the record references for the statement “Ultimately, CMP’s assumption regarding the timeliness of mutual aid proved to be incorrect due to the inaccuracy and lack of formal assessment information concerning the true extent of the damage to CMP’s system.” See Page 85 of the Examiner’s Report.**

The quoted statement is a conclusion reached by the Advisors based on the information discussed at pp. 84-89.

**22. Please provide the record references for the statement “The failure to use the criteria listed in the ESRP and to follow the plans for detailed assessment may have significantly slowed restoration.” See Page 87 of the Examiner’s Report.**

The quoted statement is a conclusion reached by the Advisors based on the information discussed at pp. 84-89.

**23. Please provide the record references for the statement “However, our investigation revealed that procedures relating to corporate management, i.e. formal assessment, were not put in place during Winter Storm 2002. Instead, CMP relied heavily on information from its Service Centers, which were using undefined (and likely disorganized) assessment processes. If CMP had upgraded to a Level 3, processes would have been put in place that may have supported storm assessment, crew tracking, and EMA and other utility coordination.” See page 88 of the Examiner’s Report.**

The quoted statement is a conclusion reached by the Advisors based on the information discussed at pp. 84-89. See also Tr. 11/7/02 at 30 where Mr. Herling states that CMP did not put its corporate assessment plan into action during Winter Storm 2002.

**24. Please provide the record references for the statement “Instead, CMP Service Centers underestimated the amount of damage and the number of resources needed to achieve timely restoration. Because corporate management was relying on the Service Centers for this vital information, decisions were likely made that did not appropriately address the actual conditions.” See Page 88 of the Examiner’s Report.**

The quoted statement is a conclusion reached by the Advisors based on the information discussed at pp. 84-89.

**25. Please provide the record references for the statement “We also find that CMP’s problems at the beginning of the Storm with the telephone system’s ability to handle large numbers of outage calls may have initially impacted CMP’s restoration effort by not giving an accurate picture of the number and location of outages.” See Page 88 of the Examiner’s Report.**

The quoted statement is a conclusion reached by the Advisors based on the information discussed at pp. 84-89. See also Responses ADV 4-18 and Question No. 10.

**26. Please provide the record references for the statement “CMP management did not have enough information to properly manage the storm at the corporate level or it did not respond appropriately to the information it was given because resource deployment decisions did not match the need in the field.” See page 89 of the Examiner’s Report.**

The quoted statement is a conclusion reached by the Advisors based on the information discussed at pp. 84-89.

**27. Please provide the record references for the statement “Although not directly listed within the recommendations of the 1998 Ice Storm Order, the Commission understood that the utilities would continue to do self-assessments and, if requested, would provide the Commission with a copy of the results of the self-assessment.” See page 100 of the Examiner’s Report.**

There are no record references for this statement. It reflects the understanding of the Advisory Staff who participated in both this proceeding and the Commission’s *1998 Ice Storm Investigation*.

Submitted by,

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Trina M. Bragdon  
On behalf of the Advisory Staff